How Physicalists Dismiss Consciousness - Medium.com
The hard problem and Anil Seth’s ‘real problem’(Apr 22, 2025)
I’ve been looking at some articles over at Medium.com, lots of interesting dialogue. "Matthew" offered me a chance to revisit a favorite dialogue I’m trying to share.
His closing punchline begs for closer scrutiny:
"The hard problem will require much more first principle positions than neuroscience can provide if its explanation is to be serious. Explaining how within some bundle of cells in your brain is an actual experience is a problem so preposterously difficult and seemingly absurd is seems to beg an entire re-conception of how we even understand what any “stuff” actually is.
And it may be that these principles will always remain philosophical (read metaphysical) in nature, since it seems to be the case that a persistent observational equivalence will remain between various positions as to the nature of consciousness.
But in any discussions on the nature of consciousness, it must be remembered that physicalism remains a speculative philosophical position rather than a conclusion resultant from unequivocal explanation.
How the bundle of “stuff” inside your head produces that expansively experiential thing that you are is a question that remains scientifically elusive. The problem may be ‘real’ for a scientist, but right now, whatever Anil Seth says, the hard problem isn’t going anywhere." ( Matthew )
Physicalism remains speculative? Really? Think about what that implies. Are the formation of our universe and solar system mere philosophical positions? Is geology? Is biological evolution a philosophical position?
We don’t speak of those as if they were open metaphysical questions—yet when it comes to consciousness, suddenly we treat the physical as insufficient. Why?
